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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

Case No, 920198

v.

:

900379-CA

JAMES F. GARDNER,

:

Defendant/Petitioner.

:

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT
OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ISSUE PRESENTED
Did the Utah Court of Appeals err when it affirmed
petitioner's forgery conviction, ruling that his challenge to
state trial court jurisdiction, based upon his allegation that he
is an Indian, could not prevail under the Ute Partition Act of
1954?
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION
AND
ASSERTED GROUNDS FOR SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION
The court of appeals opinion, State v. Gardner, appears
in 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 46, copied at Appendix I to this brief; it
was entered by the court on March 18, 1992. Petitioner did not
request rehearing of the case by the court of appeals; his
petition for certiorari was timely filed, on April 16, 1992.
Petitioner asserts that all grounds for granting
certiorari listed in Rule 46, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
exist here. As explained in this brief, the only possible viable
ground for review by this Court is that found in Rule 46(d):
"When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of

municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should
be, settled by the Supreme Court."
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the United States
Constitution vests the United States Congress with the power
"[t]o regulate commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes."
Article III of the Utah Constitution provides in
pertinent part that, absent the consent of the United States to
do otherwise:
The people inhabiting this State do affirm
and declare that they forever disclaim all
right and title to the unappropriated public
lands lying within the boundaries hereof, and
to all lands lying within said limits owned
or held by any Indian or Indian tribes, and
that until the title thereto shall have been
extinguished by the United States, the same
shall be and remain subject to the
disposition of the United States, and said
Indian lands shall remain under the absolute
jurisdiction and control of the Congress of
the United States. . . .
25 U.S.C. § 677v (1988), of the Ute Partition
Act of 1954 provides:
Upon removal of Federal restrictions on
the property of each individual mixed-blood
member of the [Ute] tribe, the Secretary [of
the Interior] shall publish in the Federal
Register a proclamation declaring that the
Federal trust relationship to such individual
is terminated. Thereafter, such individual
shall not be entitled to any of the services
performed for Indians because of his status
as an Indian. All statutes*of the United
States which affect Indians because of their
status as Indians shall no longer be
applicable to such member over which
supervision has been terminated, and the laws
of the several States shall apply to such

2

member in the same manner as they apply to
other citizens within their jurisdiction.
(Emphasis added.)
• STATEMENT OF THE CASE
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ancestry and Indian affiliation were assumed to be true, those
allegations made him out to be a "terminated mixed-blood Ute
Indian," and therefore subject to state court jurisdiction under
the federal Ute Partition Act of 1954, 25 U.S.C. S 677 (1988).
Third, the State argued that if the first two points were
rejected, the case should be remanded to the trial court, to make
findings on the fact-sensitive issue of whether petitioner is
entitled to Indian status for criminal jurisdiction purposes,
with petitioner to carry the burden of proof.
The court of appeals affirmed the conviction under the
State's second point.

The court agreed that defendant had

alleged "mixed-blood" Ute status.

Therefore, because the United

States Congress had terminated "mixed-blood" Utes from federal
supervision under 25 U.S.C. § 677v (1988), defendant was subject
to state court criminal jurisdiction even if his allegations were
true.

Gardner, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. at 47. Accordingly, the court

of appeals did not analyze the State's waiver argument and its
argument about burden of proof on a possible remand.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
PETITIONER DEMONSTRATES NEITHER LEGAL
CONFLICT NOR A DEPARTURE FROM THE USUAL
COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT
OF APPEALS RESOLUTION OF HIS APPEAL.
Petitioner asks this Court to "clarify[] the limits and
boundaries of Indian Status Jurisdictional challenge consistent
with State Constitutional Provisions and State v. Haoen . . . "
(Petition at 11). He suggests that the opinion in this case
4
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to "suspend"" his appeal and remand the case 1
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court

for fact findings on his allegation of Indian status (Petition at
4, 11-12),

The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure do not provide

for such "suspension."

Further, Utah R. App. P. 23 suggests that

the grant or denial of a motion filed during the pendency of an
appeal is a matter within the appellate court's discretion.

The

court of appeals did not abuse its discretion when it denied
petitioner's "suspension and remand" motion.

Accordingly, the

court did not depart from accepted and usual practice, and this
Utah R. App. P. 46(c) ground for certiorari is not present.
POINT TWO
THE ISSUE OF FEDERAL, AND STATE LAW DECIDED BY
THE COURT OF APPEALS NEED NOT BE REVISITED BY
THIS COURT.
This Court may grant certiorari to review a court of
appeals decision on an "important question of municipal, state,
or federal law . . .."

Utah R. App. P. 46(d).

The question of

whether "terminated mixed-blood" Ute Indians are subject to state
court criminal jurisdiction is important.

However, it was

correctly answered by the court of appeals, and there is no need
for this Court to review the issue.
Examining petitioner's own allegations, the court of
appeals determined that those allegations make him out to be, at
best, a "mixed-blood" Ute.

Gardner, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. at 47.

The court held that under the Ute Partition Act, 25 U.S.C. § 677v
(1988), "mixed-blood" Utes are subject to state court criminal
jurisdiction.

Id.

This accords with settled federal law,

including that of the Utah federal district court.
6

See United

p l a t e s v , J ^ e l t e i , 'VI n i
aJHdr
Stales,

I11 '

u

"52 F 7(.I lr»Or» ( M)1 li i.'i r .
"M!? I

Sun

ll'id,

a p p e a l s c o r r e a l Jy a l i g n e d
law r e g a r d i n g

state

I'M

' ,1

1 9 8 5 ) ; St , Cloud v .
]()H.h'ii

1464-65 (D S.n
ILHHI

"*.il

'">

, „

United
The c o u r t of

I k i 1 li 1 in . an I hui i t d L i vv toiiei ri 1

jurisdiction

over "terminated"

Indians.

fli 11 i i f pet M iiniPT '< a i !]ijnipnt F not- a d d r e s s e d by t ho
""'hi1

c o u r t of a p p e a l s b e a r s m e n t i o n
Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n , A r t i c l e
Hi ni in i iijiii

stein

language t o A r t i c l e
In

iiei'inked

I I I (IV't l t i o n

nit i r»d i i i ni I 11 ni

s t a t e a u t h o r i t y over

in

i

nt

Mi,

n|

II In

does not

l i m i t e d ti/ t h e

1 1 1 , which p r o v i d e s t h a t
msiMit

pi" 1 - I M M I

lliiihill

.

lite Partition Act provides precisely such consent
1

he A-1

w ^ p i e;: t

in 1UH|I( i hi r

•• passaqr
.. ...

consti t ,ti3i.,

p

I i ii II i I 11 i

Roeci-L,

*

States

jurisdiction..

'nrii an country ,

State v.

4 "II | 1 "J 4 h ) ; Did pel v .

,.

United States. 164

The

i I 111 i-

Lrovis; ?i^ d:c :.t ra: state criminal
crimes

. ,

raw

Even before

nurt and the United

-.

of

i nl i IMLIIIH. 1 HJ y

such d i s c l a i m e r

Phuto-

I-1

save

11 r n v i r i on ' v d i s c l a i m e r

Indian lands i s

I li

UUMII

*fcnI • M^ • M *J

'

. ^

l»*b

^cause the Ute Partition
i fid i a" status fox

crimmr

JUI scticti :

Constitution -._ :*_ JJCLI

jrpuses
I_

k. \ *,

jurisdiL't

U<:

. .11] el the Utah
over petitioner.

The court of appea ] s correct 1 y ai t JL I med petitioner' s
conviction on a legal ground that is consistent with established

7

law.

Accordingly, there is no need for this Court to review this

case, and the Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be denied.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

H

day of May, 1992.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

«L_
J. KEVIN MURPHY
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a four true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari
were mailed, postage prepaid, to James F. Gardner, pro se, P.O.
Box 250, Draper, Utah

84020, this

\H

day of May, 1992.

i^-Uy
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APPENDIX I
Court of Appeals Opinion

Provo. Utah

Cite is

182 Utah Adv. Rep. 46
IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE of Utah,
Ptaiatiff aid Appellee,
v.
James F. GARDNER,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 900379-CA
FILED: March 18,1992
Eighth District, Duchesne County
Honorable A. Lynn Payne
ATTORNEYS:
James F. Gardner, Draper, Appellant Pro Se
R. Paul Van Dam and J. Kevin Murphy, Salt
Lake City, for Appellee
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Russon.
This opinion is subject to revision before
pnbikation in the Pacific Reporter.
BENCH, Presiding Jndge:
James F. Gardner appeals his conviction of
a single count of forgery on jurisdictional
grounds. We affirm.
MCE REPORTS

^PAM

u w a

47

182 Uuh Adv. Rep 46 _

FACTS
On August 14, 1985, Gardner was convicted
in state court of forgery, a second degree
felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. §766-501(3Xb) (1990). The evidence before the
trial court indicated that Gardner negotiated a
check belonging to his brother-in-law to
Rebecca Neary in Roosevelt, Utah.1 Gardner
was sentenced to serve from one to fifteen
years at the Utah State Prison.
Almost four years later, Gardner petitioned
the trial court for post conviction relief,
seeking resentencing nunc pro tunc to allow
him to take a direct appeal. Gardner alleged
that he instructed trial counsel to appeal the
forgery conviction and believed an appeal had
been taken, but that trial counsel had failed to
comply with his request. The trial court found
the allegations to be true, and resentenced
Gardner in accordance with State v. Johnson,
635 P.2d 36,38 (Utah 1981).
Now on appeal, Gardner alleges that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction over him due to
his Indian status. As an addendum to his
appellate brief, Gardner includes a personal
affidavit in support of his claimed Indian
status.2 The affidavit states that Gardner's
paternal and maternal grandfathers were "fullblooded" Ute Indians;3 that both his mother
and his maternal grandmother were enrolled as
members of the Uintah band of the Ute tribe
until their status was terminated in 1954; that
his father is eligible for enrollment with the
Uncompahgre Band of the Ute tribe in Colorado; that Gardner is associated with the
Uintah Band of the Affiliated Ute Citizens;
that Gardner is a second generation
"terminated Ute"; that Gardner was raised,
educated, and employed on the reservation;
that Gardner practices Indian religion by
participation in Indian ceremonies and culture;
and that Gardner is known as an Indian rights
activist.
JURISDICTION
Gardner alleges that the district court lacked
jurisdiction over him due to his claimed Indian
status. "It has long been held that exclusive
federal criminal jurisdiction over Indians in
'Indian country' includes all persons found to
be 'Indian' under federal law ...." Ute Indian
Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072,
1078 n.14 (1981) (citations omitted); see also
18 U.S.C. §§1152-1153 (1984).
Between 1954 and 1956, Congress carved
out certain exceptions to exclusive federal
supervision over Indian property and persons.
See 25 U.S.C. §§450-1300. See also Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States.
406 U.S. 128, 133, 92 S. Ct. 1456, 1462
(1972). Under 25 U.S.C. §677, Congress
terminated federal supervision over trust property of the Ute Indian Tribe on the Uintah
and Ouray Reservation, and ordered the par-

tition and distribution of tribal assets between
"mixed-blood" and "full-blood" members.
As part of that partition and distribution,
Congress terminated exclusive federal supervision over "mixed-blood" Utes under 25
U.S.C. §677v, which states, in relevant
portion, as follows:
All statutes of the United States
which affect Indians because of
their status as Indians shall no
longer be applicable to such
member over which supervision has
been terminated, and the laws of
the several States shall apply to
such member in the same manner as
they apply to other citizens within
their jurisdiction.
By terminating federal control over "mixedblood" Utes, Congress expressly transferred
jurisdiction over them to state courts.
The challenge to jurisdiction based on
Indian status could conceivably present a
question of fact that would require remand for
an evidentiary hearing. In the present case,
however, remand is unnecessary because
Gardner has not asserted facts sufficient to
challenge the jurisdiction of the trial court.
Gardner asserts that he is a "terminated Ute."
The term "terminated Ute" is synonymous
with "mixed-blood" Ute as used in 25 U.S.C.
§677v. See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128, 92 S. Ct. 1456,
1463 (1972). Gardner further asserts that he is
associated with the Affiliated Ute Citizens, an
unincorporated association of "mixed-blood"
Utes organized pursuant to 25 U.S.C. §677e. Id.
Therefore, even if we take as true the
representations proffered in Gardner's affidavit, the trial court had jurisdiction over
Gardner because exclusive federal jurisdiction
over "mixed-blood" Utes has been terminated.
CONCLUSION
Gardner failed to present facts sufficient to
raise a jurisdictional challenge. We therefore
affirm his conviction.
Russell W. Bench, Presiding Judge
WE CONCUR:
Judith M. Billings, Judge
Leonard H. Russon, Judge
1. For purposes of this opinion, we assume that
Roosevelt lies within the boundaries of the Uintah
and Ouray Indian Reservation. See Ute Indian Tribe
v. State of Utah, 521 F.Supp. 1072, 1188 (D. Utah
1981). See also State v. Hagcn, 802 P.2d 745, 746
(Utah App. 1990), cert, granted, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah
1991).
2. It is well settled that we do not review evidence
presented for the first time on appeal. Munns v.
Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 119 (Utah App. 1990). We
therefore do not consider Gardner's affidavit as
proof of the fact* alleged therein.
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3. 25 U.S.C. §677a defines a "full-blood* Ute as
•a member of the tribe who possesses one-half
degree of Ute Indian blood and a total of Indian
blood in excess of one-half, excepting those who
become mixed-bloods by choice.../ A "mixedblood" Ute, by comparison, is defined as "a
member of the tribe who does not possess sufficient
Indian or Ute Indian blood to fall within the fullblood class as herein defined, and those who
become mixed-bloods by choice under the provisions of section 677c of this title." Id.
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BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of forgery, Utah Code
Ann. S 76-6-501(3)(b) (1978), a second degree felony, in the
Eighth Judicial District Court, in and for Duchesne County, the
Honorable A. Lynn Payne, District Court Judge Pro Tem, presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1991).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Defendant's pro se brief on appeal, while clearly the
product of diligent labor, addresses a number of legal,
historical, and political points that are not necessarily
pertinent to this case.

The State believes that those points

that are pertinent can be properly addressed within defendant's
argument that "the State of Utah Lackfed] Personal, Subject
Matter, and territorial Jurisdiction" to prosecute him for the
forgery (Br. of Appellant at 5).
Accordingly, the State will address defendant's appeal

as the question of whether the state trial court lacked
jurisdiction to try the case.

Defendant alleges that the forgery

occurred in "Indian country," and that he is a Native American
"Indian."

Based on these allegations, he argues that

jurisdiction over this case rested exclusively with the federal
district court (Br. of Appellant at 5, 6).
As developed more fully in the State's argument, the
ultimate legal determination of jurisdiction here depends upon
subsidiary issues of fact, reviewable on a "clear error"
standard.

See State v. Vigil, 164 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 30 (Utah

App. 1991).
The State presents two additional issues, either of
which may resolve this appeal without reaching the merits of
defendant's claim that he is an Indian.

First, it must be

ascertained whether defendant failed to raise his jurisdictional
challenge in the trial court.

This presents a question of law,

inasmuch as this court must independently examine the record.

If

defendant did not thus preserve his jurisdictional challenge for
appeal, it must then be decided, as a matter of law, whether to
affirm the conviction.
Second, if defendant is assumed to be an Indian, there
is an issue of whether the state of Utah has criminal
jurisdiction over him pursuant to the Ute Partition Act of 1954,
25 U.S.C.A. SS 677-677aa (West 1983).

This is an issue of law,

reviewed on a correction-of-error standard, in that it entails
statutory interpretation.

Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.. 771
2

P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 1989).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the United States
Constitution vests the United States Congress with the power
*[t]o regulate commerce . . • with the Indian Tribes."
Article III of the Utah Constitution provides in
pertinent part that, absent the consent of the United States to
do otherwise:
The people inhabiting this State do affirm
and declare that they forever disclaim all
right and title to the unappropriated public
lands lying within the boundaries hereof, and
to all lands lying within said limits owned
or held by any Indian or Indian tribes, and
that until the title thereto shall have been
extinguished by the United States, the same
shall be and remain subject to the
disposition of the United States, and said
Indian lands shall remain under the absolute
jurisdiction and control of the Congress of
the United States. . . .
The Federal Enclaves Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988)
provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided
by law, the general laws of the United States
as to the punishment of offenses committed in
any place within the sole and exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States, except the
District of Columbia, shall extend to the
Indian country.
This section shall not extend to
offenses committed by one Indian against the
person or property of another Indian, nor to
any Indian committing any offense in the
Indian country who has been*punished by the
local law of the tribe, or to any case where,
by treaty stipulations, the exclusive
jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be
secured to the Indian tribes respectively.
25 U.S.C. S 677v (1988), of the Ute Partition
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Act of 1954 provides:
Upon removal of Federal restrictions on
the property of each individual mixed-blood
member of the [Ute] tribe, the Secretary [of
the Interior] shall publish in the Federal
Register a proclamation declaring that the
Federal trust relationship to such individual
is terminated. Thereafter, such individual
shall not be entitled to any of the services
performed for Indians because of his status
as an Indian. All statutes of the United
States which affect Indians because of their
status as Indians shall no longer be
applicable to such member over which
supervision has been terminated, and the laws
of the several States shall apply to such
member in the same manner as they apply to
other citizens within their jurisdiction.
Necessary text of any other relevant constitutional,
statutory, and rule provisions is contained in the body of this
brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant James F. Gardner was charged in the state
court with a single count of second degree felony forgery, Utah
Code Ann. S 76-6-501(3)(b) (1990) (R. 2). He was found guilty as
charged by jury trial on August 14, 1985, and sentenced to serve
one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison (R. 28, 45).
Nearly four years later, defendant petitioned for
postconviction relief, alleging that he had asked his trial
counsel to appeal the forgery conviction shortly after trial, and
that counsel had failed to honor that request (R. 56-59).
Finding this allegation to be true, tfce trial court granted the
petition, and resentenced defendant for the conviction (R. 128,
148-49).

This direct appeal followed.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The forgery for which defendant was convicted occurred
in the city of Roosevelt (T. 8/14/85 at 18), which lies within
the boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation.

See

map appended to Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F. Supp.
1072, 1188 (D. Utah 1981).

Trial testimony showed that defendant

had, without authorization, obtained check blanks belonging to
his brother-in-law and negotiated one of these for 150 dollars
(T. 8/14/85 at 10-12, 15-16).l
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant never raised his jurisdictional challenge in
the trial court.

Nor was the the prosecution or the trial court

otherwise informed of the need to prove jurisdiction by showing
that defendant is not an Indian.
Indian jurisdiction is usually treated as a question of
subject matter jurisdiction, which is not waived by the absence
of a timely trial court objection.

However, based on policy

considerations and sound precedent, this jurisdictional challenge
should be considered waived by defendant's failure to raise it in
the trial court, and the conviction should be affirmed.
If defendant's belated factual assertions about Indian
status are assumed to be true, his conviction should be affirmed
under the Ute Partition Act of 1954. Under that Act, defendant,

*Record citations: "R.H refers to the trial court record in
this case only, defendant's forgery conviction. "T." refers to
hearing transcripts on the date indicated in this case, including
defendant's petition for postconviction relief.
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as a "mixed-blood" Ute Indian, is subject to state court criminal
jurisdiction.
If this court will not affirm the conviction on either
of the foregoing bases, the resolution of this jurisdictional
challenge still turns on the fact-sensitive issue of whether
defendant is an Indian.

In this event, because no evidence on

this issue exists in the present trial court record, defendant's
challenge should be remanded to the trial court.

On remand,

defendant should bear the burden of proving that jurisdiction was
lacking.
INTRODUCTION TO ARGUMENT
Some background on the law of Indian criminal
jurisdiction as it applies to this case is helpful to place the
arguments in perspective.

A thorough overview is found in

Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands; A Journey
Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 Ariz. L. Rev. 503 (1976)
("Clinton") (copied at Appendix 1 of this brief).

As a general

rule, criminal jurisdiction over Indian country rests exclusively
with the federal courts.

U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8; Utah Const.

Art. Ill; 18 U.S.C. SS 1152, 1153 (1988); Ex Parte Pero, 99 F.2d
28, 29 (7th Cir. 1938), cert, denied, 306 U.S. 643, 59 S. Ct. 581
(1939); Clinton at 523 & n. 94.
Congress, however, has authorized certain exceptions to
the general rule.

Title 18 U.S.C, sections 1152 and 1153, read

together, specifically except "minor" Indian against Indian
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crimes within Indian country from exclusive federal
jurisdiction.2
courts.

Jurisdiction over such crimes is in the tribal

United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 643 n.2, 97 S.

Ct. 1395, 1397 n. 2 (1977); H.R. Rep. No. 61, 102nd Cong., 1st
Sess., at 3-4, (1991) (attached as exhibit D to Br. of
Appellant).3
Congress has also granted some states criminal
jurisdiction over at least portions of Indian country, under 18
U.S.C. S 1162 (1988).
grant of jurisdiction.

Utah is not included under this particular
Congress now also allows state

jurisdiction over Indian offenses in Indian country upon the
express consent of Indian tribes, and Utah has expressed its
willingness to accept such jurisdiction.

25 U.S.C. S 1321

(1988); Utah Code Ann. § 63-36-201 (Supp. 1991).

To date,

however, Utah has received no tribal consent to state
jurisdiction under these provisions.
However, another important source of congressionallyauthorized state jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country
2

Section 1152 states that federal jurisdiction "shall not
extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the person or
property of another Indian . . . .,f However, section 1153, the
Major Crimes Act, takes back much of this section 1152 exception,
bringing certain major crimes by Indians in Indian country, whether
or not against other Indians, within federal jurisdiction.
Clinton questions whether tribal jurisdiction over Indian
against Indian crimes is indeed limited to minor crimes. 18 Ariz.
L. Rev. at 559-60. However, tribal courts are limited in the
punishment they may mete out, to one year imprisonment or a
$5000.00 fine, or both, per offense. 25 U.S.C. $ 1302(7) (1988).
3

Section 1152 also exempts crimes punished by tribal law, and
crimes where jurisdiction rests in the tribe by treaty, from
federal jurisdiction.
Clinton reports that the only treaties
vesting criminal jurisdiction in Indian tribes were executed before
the end of the eighteenth century. Clinton at 531 & n. 128.

exists in the various Indian tribe "termination acts/' passed
largely in the 1950s.
550-51.

Clinton, 18 Ariz. L. Rev. at 548 & n. 220,

This source of state jurisdiction is significant here,

in that "mixed-blood" Ute Indians were terminated from federal
supervision and placed under state jurisdiction by the Ute
Partition Act of 1954, 25 U.S.C. SS 677-677aa (1988).
A major judicially-created exception to exclusive
federal jurisdiction over Indian country is that crimes in Indian
country where neither the victim nor the perpetrator is an Indian
are subject to state jurisdiction.

United States v. Wheeler, 435

U.S. 313, 324, 98 S. Ct. 1079, 1087 (1978), cited in Goforth v.
State, 644 P.2d 114, 116 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982); Clinton, 18
Ariz. L. Rev. at 524-25.
Finally, the jurisdiction exercised by tribal courts
varies from tribe to tribe.

Here, the Ute Indian Tribe, which

occupies the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, does not take
jurisdiction of cases where the parties are not formally enrolled
members of that tribe, where an alternative forum exists to
resolve the case, and where tribal interests are not affected.
Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1077 n.8
(D. Utah 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th
Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 994, 107 S. Ct. 596
(1986) (citing Ute Tribe Law and Order Code).
The forgoing jurisdictional rules effectively provide
that where the perpetrator or the victim of a crime, but not
both, are Indian, and the crime is committed within Indian
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country/ then jurisdiction rests exclusively with the federal
court.

However, even if a criminal defendant is an Indian, he or

she will fall under state jurisdiction if a federal termination
act so provides. Where neither the perpetrator nor the victim is
an Indian, even where the crime occurs in Indian country, the
state court has jurisdiction.

If both perpetrator and victim are

Indian, and the crime occurs in Indian country and is "minor,"
then tribal courts may have jurisdiction.
Here, defendant does not allege that both he and the
victim of his crime are Indians, nor does he otherwise suggest
that jurisdiction properly lies in the Ute tribal court.

Indeed,

under Ute tribal law, he has no basis for such an assertion,
because he does not claim to be formally enrolled in that tribe.
Instead, defendant's claim is that only the federal district
court had jurisdiction to try him for the forgery (Br. of
Appellant at 5, 6). Thus the claimed jurisdictional conflict is
only between state and federal jurisdiction.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEM WAS WAIVED BY THE
FAILURE TO RAISE IT IN THE TRIAL COURT, AND
THE CONVICTION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
A.

To Fall Outside State Jurisdiction Under
Present Law. Defendant Must be an Indian.
As explained in the introduction to this argument, in

order for defendant to fall outside of state jurisdiction, his
crime must have been committed in Indian country, and defendant
must be an Indian.

Under the present law of this Court, the
9

forgery was committed in Indian country, because Roosevelt lies
within the outer boundary of an Indian reservation.

State v.

Haaen, 802 P.2d 745, 747 (Utah App. 1990), cert, granted April
23, 1991, Utah Supreme Court No. 910017. This law may change,
however, pursuant to the Utah Supreme Court's grant of certiorari
in Haaen and the pending case of State v. Perank, Utah Supreme
Court No. 860196.

Both those cases deal with the question of

whether the town of Myton, near Roosevelt, is no longer Indian
country, because of federal "disestablishment" of the Uintah and
Ouray Reservation/
If the supreme court rules in favor of the State in
Haaen and Perank, it is likely that Roosevelt can also be held
not to be Indian country.

In that case, even if defendant is an

Indian, his conviction would be proper because the crime was
committed outside of Indian country, under exclusive state court
jurisdiction.

St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456,

1459 (D.S.D. 1988) ("State courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over crimes occurring outside of Indian country").

See also Utah

Code Ann. S 76-1-201(a) (1990) (Utah state courts have
jurisdiction over offenses committed within the state).

As it

did in Haaen. then, the State suggests that it may be wise for
this court to await the outcome of Perank, and now also Haaen, in
the supreme court before deciding this case.
However, even if the Indian country status of Roosevelt

*The State's brief in Haaen. including a portion of its brief
in Perank, is copied at Appendix 2 of this brief.
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must be accepted for the time being, it cannot be conceded that
defendant is an Indian.

Even now, he has provided no independent

corroboration of Indian status, but relies solely on the naked
allegations in his brief and attached affidavit.
The two elements required to prove Indian status are
recited in Haaen, 802 P.2d at 747 n.2. First, it must appear
that defendant has a significant percentage of Indian blood, and
second, defendant must be recognized as an Indian either by the
federal government or some group of Indians.

Ld. (citations

omitted); Ex Parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 31 (7th Cir. 1938); Clinton,
Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a
Jurisdictional Maze, 18 Ariz. L. Rev. 503, 515-16 (1976) (copied
at Appendix 1 of this brief).
The foregoing elements of Indian status are highly
fact-dependent.

The "Indian blood" element, for example,

presents a question of fact, quite apart from the legal question
of how much Indian blood is sufficient to satisfy that element.
See Haaen, 802 P.2d at 747 n.2 (noting division of authority on
the latter question).

See Brief of Appellant at 36 (alleging

Indian ancestry).
The allegations now made by defendant to support the
"recognition" element of Indian status are also factual issues.
See Brief of Appellant at 35-36 (alleging history of Indian
upbringing, receipt of Indian benefits, participation in Indian
culture, membership in Indian organizations). However, defendant
raised no jurisdictional challenge and presented no evidence on
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any factual issues related to Indian status in the trial court.
B.

The Jurisdictional Problem in this Case was
Neither Raised Nor Otherwise Apparent to the Trial
Court.
In his brief on appeal and the affidavit he has

attached to that brief, defendant asserts that he raised his
jurisdictional challenge in the trial court, and that his
challenge was repeatedly rebuffed (Br. of Appellant at 2, 3, 9).
None of these assertions are documented by record citations, as
required by Utah R. App. P. 24(e).
Neither defendant's brief nor the affidavit attached to
that brief are part of the record on appeal, because neither is
an original paper or exhibit filed with the trial court.
App. P. 11(a).

Utah R.

Therefore, the factual allegations therein, to

the extent they are offered as evidence, should be ignored.
State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 1986) (references to
matters outside the record are inappropriate, irrelevant, and
will not be considered on appeal).

Further, the State's

examination of the actual record has revealed no jurisdictional
challenge.5
5

For example, defendant
claims that he raised his
jurisdictional challenge on or about March 18, 1985 (Br. of
Appellant at 2). The record shows that a hearing was held on March
19, 1985, but the minute entry commemorating that hearing does not
mention any jurisdictional challenge (R. 7).
Defendant claims to have renewed his jurisdictional challenge
during an in-chambers conference just^before his forgery trial, on
August 14, 1985 (affidavit attached to Br, of Appellant, at 3(A)).
However, the record reveals only a motion in limine, which was
granted (T. 8/14/85 at 3-4), and a later motion to dismiss based on
insufficient evidence, which was denied (T. 8/14/85 at 27-28).
Finally, defendant also claims that he raised his
jurisdictional challenge during proceedings involving a murder
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Defendant also failed to raise the jurisdictional issue
at any point in the trial court proceedings associated with his
petition for postconviction relief in this case (e.g., R* 56-59;
T. 3/1/90).

Thus he raises the Indian jurisdiction issue for the

first time on appeal.
Consistent with the absence of any jurisdictional
challenge, the trial court records are otherwise devoid of any
evidence that defendant is an Indian.

The issue did not even

arise inadvertently through evidence and testimony routinely
presented in the case. Additionally, it does not appear that the
possibility of Indian status should have been obvious to the
trial court.

Defendant's name does not suggest that he is an

Indian, and the record contains no reference to his race. As
follows, then, because the Indian jurisdiction issue was not
raised in the trial court, it should be deemed waived on appeal.
C.

The Indian Status Issue Should be Deemed
Waived bv Defendant's Failure to Raise it in
the Trial Court.
Defendant argues that the state court lacked "Personal,

Subject Matter, and territorial Jurisdiction" to prosecute him
for the forgery (Br. of Appellant at 5).

To resolve this appeal,

some consideration must be given to which, if any, of these types
of jurisdictional problems exists here.
The "territorial jurisdiction" problem appears to
charge that was pending against him at the same time as the forgery
charge (Br. of Appellant at 2). The murder case record is not a
part of the record in this case. Accordingly, references to the
murder case should also be ignored, and will not be further
addressed in the State's brief.
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address the status of the place where the forgery occurred,
specifically, whether Roosevelt is Indian country.

As noted,

because that issue is pending before the Utah Supreme Court in
Haaen and Perank, the State, without conceding it, will not
further address it in this brief.
It remains to be determined whether the jurisdictional
problem should be treated as one of personal jurisdiction or as
subject matter jurisdiction.

As follows, the State's position is

that while the problem resembles subject matter jurisdiction, it
should be treated here as having been waived, like personal
jurisdiction, by the failure to present it in the trial court.
See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h) (applicable to criminal proceedings via
Utah R. Civ. P. 81) (personal jurisdiction defect is waived if
not raised in trial court).
Utah law is unsettled on the question of whether Indian
jurisdiction should be treated as personal jurisdiction or
subject matter jurisdiction.

In State Dep't of Social Services

v. Viiil, 784 P.2d 1130 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court
avoided the question in a civil context, reversing a judgment for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, thereby not reaching
defendant's claim that personal jurisdiction was also lacking.
Id. at 1134.

In Haaen and State v. Coando, 784 P.2d 1228, 1229

(Utah App. 1989), cert, granted, Utah Supreme Court No. 900019
(March 7, 1990), this Court treated tKe problem in the criminal
context without reference to whether it involved personal or
subject matter jurisdiction.
14

Because Indian jurisdiction involves the allocation of
authority among various courts, it would appear to involve
subject matter jurisdiction.

Indeed, it has been held that

Indian criminal jurisdiction, like subject matter jurisdiction,
cannot be waived by the failure to raise it or by consent of the
parties.

See St. Cloud, 702 F. Supp. at 1458; In re Carmen's

Petition, 165 F. Supp. 942, 950 (D.C. Cal. 1958), aff'd sub nom.
Dickson v. Carmen, 270 F.2d 809 (9 Cir. 1959), cert, denied, 361
U.S. 934, 80 S. Ct. 375, reh'q denied, 361 U.S. 973, 80 S. Ct.
585 (1960); Wesley v. Schneckloth, 55 Wash. 2d 290, 346 P.2d 658,
662 (1959) (en banc).

See also Clinton, 18 Ariz. L. Rev. at 528

("the issue is subject matter jurisdiction").
However, it is questionable whether Indian criminal
jurisdiction must be strictly treated as non-waivable, subject
matter jurisdiction.

One authority does not cast general

criminal jurisdiction in terms of personal versus subject matter
jurisdiction at all, but rather as the power to create criminal
laws versus the power to enforce them.

1 W. LaFave & A. Scott,

Substantive Criminal Law § 2.7(a) (1986).

Notwithstanding the

authority to the contrary, it has been held, as follows, that the
issue of Indian criminal jurisdiction can be waived.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit applies a "raise it or lose it" approach to the federal
prosecution of non-Indians who commit*crimes in Indian country*
It is far more manageable for the defendant
to shoulder the burden of producing evidence
that he is a member of a federally recognized
tribe than it is for the Government to
15

produce evidence that he is not a member of
any one of the hundreds of such tribes. We
accordingly hold that the Government need not
allege the non-Indian status of the defendant
in an indictment under [18 U.S.C.A.] section
1152, nor does it have the burden of going
forward on that issue. Once the defendant
properly raises the issue of his Indian
status, then the ultimate burden of proof
remains, of course, upon the Government.
United States v. Hester, 719 F.2d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir. 1983).
Hester thus held that it is not necessary for the prosecution to
allege or prove a defendant's non-Indian status until and unless
the issue is raised by the defendant.
For several reasons, the Hester approach is sound in a
case like this, where neither the prosecution nor the trial court
were on notice that an Indian jurisdiction problem might exist.
First, if strictly treated as subject matter and entertained even
though not timely presented, a parade of other state-convicted
felons who committed their crimes in Indian country can be
expected to raise similar uncorroborated claims that they are
"Indians" and demand that their convictions be reversed.

This is

a particularly nightmarish possibility if the burden is placed on
the State disprove such belated claims.6
Second, it is the criminal defendant who will best know
his or her own racial and social background.

It is therefore

reasonable to expect the defendant to raise the Indian
jurisdiction issue.

Such an expectation would not shift the

6

As explained in Point Three, section C of this brief, the
State's position is that the burden of proving Indian status should
rest with defendant where the Indian jurisdiction challenge is not
raised until after the conviction.

16

ultimate burden of proving jurisdiction at trial, which, under
Haoen, 802 P. 2d at 747, lies with the prosecution.7

It would

simply provide the prosecution with notice that the burden exists
in the special Indian jurisdiction context, when it is not
otherwise apparent.
Third, under the Federal Enclaves Act, 18 U.S.C. S 1152
(1988), and the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. S 13 (1988),
if defendant were tried in the federal court, that forum would
apply Utah's forgery statute to his offense.

See United States

v. Burland, 441 F.2d 1199, 1200 (9th Cir. 1971), cert, denied,
404 U.S. 842, 97 S. Ct. 137 (Montana forgery statute applied to
Indian country prosecution in federal court).

Defendant does not

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence that supports his
conviction.

Therefore, there is no reason to assume that he

would receive any better treatment or a more favorable outcome in
the federal court, applying Utah law.

In this light, defendant's

effort to challenge jurisdiction can be seen as nothing more than
forum shopping.

To entertain his challenge now would encourage

criminal defendants who may be Indians to withhold that claim in
the state court and then, if convicted, raise it to avoid the
conviction.

Requiring the issue to be raised in the trial court

will discourage the temptation to thus "plant error" in the trial
court, a practice this court has condemned.

See State v.

Belaard, 811 P.2d 211, 215 (Utah App. 1991).
7

Contra, State v. Klindt, 782 F.2d 401, 403-04 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1989) (defendant seeking to avoid state jurisdiction has
burden of proving Indian status).
17

Fourth, a "raise it or lose it" approach is also
consistent with Hagen.

In Haaen. the reversible error was the

State's failure, in the trial court, "to prove he [defendant] is
not an Indian when confronted with his claim that he is."
P.2d at 746 (emphasis added).
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Haoen thus assumes that the claim

of Indian status will be raised in the trial court.

Such claim

was absent here; nor, as noted earlier, was the possibility of
that claim otherwise apparent.

Compare In re Carmen's Petition,

165 F. Supp. at 950 (although jurisdictional challenge not
formally raised, trial testimony that defendant was an Indian put
court on notice of problem, and challenge was not waived).
Finally, it should be noted that in other contexts, a
failure to raise a jurisdictional defect in the trial court
operates as a waiver of the defect on appeal.

E.g., State v.

Smith, 162 Utah Adv. Rep. 39, 42 (Utah App. 1991) and State v.
Ouintana, No. 900264-CA, slip op. at 1 (Utah App. Oct. 4, 1991)
(State's failure to raise untimeliness of motion to withdraw
plea, arguably jurisdictional in character, waived where not
properly raised in trial court).

See also State v. Pierce, 782

P.2d 194, 196 (Utah App. 1989) (non-expiration of criminal
statute of limitations is jurisdictional issue to be proven by
prosecution "whenever that issue is properly raised").
In sum, because defendant did not make his present
allegations of Indian status in the trial court, and because
neither the State nor the trial court was otherwise on notice
that defendant might be an Indian, this court should hold that
18

defendant waived the issue. Accordingly, his forgery conviction
should be affirmed.
POINT II
IF DEFENDANT IS AN INDIAN, HE IS SUBJECT TO
STATE COURT JURISDICTION UNDER THE FEDERAL
TERMINATION OF SUPERVISION OVER MIXED-BLOOD
UTE INDIANS.
Even if defendant's undocumented allegations of Indian
status are taken as true, his conviction should be affirmed
because his claimed Indian affiliation is with a group of Indians
that has long been "terminated" from federal criminal
jurisdiction.

Defendant alleges that he is a member of the

Uintah Band of Ute Indians, and that he is associated with the
Affiliated Ute Citizens organization, groups that he identifies
as "Distinct Legal entit[ies]n (Br. of Appellant at 38-39).
Regarding the first allegation, defendant says that he
is "a Recognized Member of the Uintah Band By Other Members
thereof" (Br. of Appellant at 28), and does not say that he is
formally enrolled in that band.

He also cites his mother's

listing on the final roll of "mixed-blood" Ute Indians, published
in the April 5, 1956 Federal Register8 (Br. of Appellant at 36),
as a basis for his Uintah band membership.
As to the alleged membership in the Affiliated Ute
Citizens, that entity is an organization of mixed-blood Ute
Indians formed in 1956.

It was formed for the purpose of

representing the mixed-bloods in the distribution of tribal

8

Copied at Appendix 3 of this brief.
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assets under the Ute Partition Act of 1954f 25 U.S.C.A. SS 677677aa (West 1983)-

Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United

States, 406 U.S. 128, 135-36, 92 S. Ct. 1456, 1463 (1972).
The mixed-blood Utes, including defendant's mother,
were terminated from federal supervision under the Ute Partition
Act.

Regarding those mixed-blood Utes, the Act provides:
All statutes of the United States which
affect Indians because of their status as
Indians shall no longer be applicable to such
member over which supervision has been
terminated, and the laws of the several
States shall apply to such member in the same
manner as they apply to other citizens within
their jurisdiction.

25 U.S.C. S 677v (1988) (emphasis added).

The plain language of

this provision has been unquestioned as ending federal criminal
jurisdiction over mixed-blood Ute Indians, and vesting that
jurisdiction in Utah's state courts.

See United States v.

Felter, 546 F. Supp. 1002, 1014 & n. 28 (D. Utah 1982), aff'd,
752 F.2d 1505 (10th Cir. 1985).

Accord, St. Cloud v. United

States, 702 F. Supp. 1456, 1464-65 (D.S.D. 1988) (Indians whose
tribes have been "terminated" are subject to state jurisdiction).
Therefore defendant, in claiming to be a mixed-blood Ute, brings
himself within a class of citizens who, although they have Indian
heritage, have been expressly made subject to state criminal
jurisdiction.
Defendant complains that st^te jurisdiction over his
case should not be found just because of his mother's presence on
the roll of "terminated" mixed-blood Ute Indians.

He argues that

because he was not yet born when the Ute Partition Act took
20

effect, he cannot be one of the "individuals" who were
"terminated" for federal criminal jurisdiction purposes, unless
he is first afforded a hearing (Br. of Appellant at 37-40).

This

position is untenable, and unsupported by the history of the Ute
Partition Act.
Defendant's complaint is untenable because, by
extension, it would suggest that nobody is bound by any law
passed before his or her birth.

The legislative history of the

Act reveals that it was grounded in an agreement between fullblood and mixed-blood Ute Indians to part company, as distinctive
groups, with only the former group remaining under federal
supervision.

H.R. Rep. No. 2493, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1954),

reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3355-3359 (1954)
(copied at Appendix 4 to this brief).

Thus the consent of the

mixed-blood Utes to this arrangement, in 1954, is binding upon
their descendants today.9

Defendant, if he is descended from

"terminated" mixed-blood Ute Indians, is subject to the criminal
jurisdiction of Utah state courts.
Defendant also ties his claim of Indian status to his
father's purported eligibility for tribal enrollment (Br. of
Appellant at 36). It is unclear which tribe is allegedly open to
defendant's father.

It appears, however, that defendant is again

referring to the Ute tribe, because hte identifies his paternal

9

"Termination acts" such as the Ute Partition Act have been
roundly criticized in more recent years, and in some instances
repealed. See Felter, 546 F.Supp. at 1004-06. However, the Ute
Partition Act, whether or not a "good" law, remains the law.
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grandfather as an enrolled Uncompahgre (id.), and the Uncompahgre
comprise one "band" of the Ute Indians. Ute Indian Tribe v.
State of Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1093 (D. Utah 1981), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc),
cert, denied, 479 U.S. 994, 107 S. Ct. 596 (1986).

Thus it

appears that defendant also claims a Ute tribe affiliation
through his father.

Defendant does not say, however, whether his

father is or is not a "terminated" Indian.

On the paternal side,

then, defendant's jurisdictional status is indeterminate.
Given, however, that defendant's more specific claimed
Indian ancestry is traced to his mother, whose Indian status was
clearly terminated for jurisdictional purposes, and that his
claimed Indian affiliations are also to "terminated" mixed-blood
Utes, these considerations should control here.

By affiliating

himself with people who have been terminated from federal
criminal jurisdiction, then, defendant has effectively subjected
himself to state criminal jurisdiction, notwithstanding his
father's uncertain status.

On this basis, the state court had

jurisdiction to try him for forgery under the Ute Partition Act,
and the conviction should be affirmed.
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POINT III
IF THE CONVICTION CANNOT BE AFFIRMED
OTHERWISE, THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE SHOULD BE
REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT, WHERE DEFENDANT
SHOULD BEAR THE BURDEN OF PROOF.
A.

Because No Evidence Relating to Defendant's
Claimed Indian Status was Presented in the
Trial Court, there is Nothing to Review on
Appeal.
If this Court applies a strict subject matter

jurisdiction analysis to the Indian jurisdiction question, such
that defendant can raise it even at this late date, and if it
will not affirm defendant's conviction under the Ute Partition
Act, the conviction still cannot be reversed at this time, as
defendant urges.

This Court cannot reach the merits of

defendant's allegation that he is an Indian, because there is no
evidence in the record on this fact-sensitive issue.
Because the issue was never investigated by the trial
court, only defendant's unsupported allegations of Indian blood
and Indian recognition in his brief are before this Court.
Therefore, because appellate courts do not sit to try disputed
issues of fact, it would be premature for this Court to decide
the jurisdictional issue raised by defendant at this time.
Instead, the issue properly belongs in the trial court.
B.

Defendant's Indian Status Claim Should be
Heard by the Trial Court on a Limited Remand.
If defendant's jurisdictional question was not waived,

the State suggests a remand to the trial court for the limited
purpose of determining whether defendant is an Indian.

If the

trial court determines that defendant is an Indian, such that the
23

trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the conviction
must then be set aside.

State Dep't of Social Services v. Villi.

784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989) (judgment entered by a court that
lacks subject matter jurisdiction is void).
By airing his jurisdictional challenge in the trial
court, defendant will be availing himself of the forum that is
equipped to decide the issues of fact related to that challenge.
A full evidentiary hearing, unavailable in the appellate court,
can be held.

At such hearing, both defendant and the State can

present evidence relating to defendant's claimed Indian status,
and each side will have the opportunity to test the admissibility
and credibility of the other's evidence.
With the evidence before it, the trial court will
decide whether the allegations that support defendant's claimed
Indian status are true.

The trial court will also be afforded

the initial opportunity to decide which facts are relevant and
necessary, as a matter of law, to prove or defeat defendant's
claim of Indian status.

If defendant is found to be a mixed-

blood Ute, the legal question of state jurisdiction over
defendant under the Ute Partition Act can also be considered.
Once all this is done, a complete record for appellate review of
defendant's jurisdictional challenge will be available in the
event that an appeal is again taken.
C.

In the Trial Court, Defendant Should Bear the
Burden of Proving that He is an Indian.
On remand, defendant should bear the burden of

defeating state court jurisdiction by proving that he is an
24

Indian, because his conviction was entered by a state district
court, a court of general jurisdiction.10

In a post-judgment

challenge to the decision of such a court, the burden of proof is
on the challenger to show a lack of subject matter jurisdiction:
M

When a judgment, including a default judgment, has been entered

by a court of general jurisdiction, the law presumes that
jurisdiction exists, and the burden is on the party attacking
jurisdiction to prove its absence."

Villi, 784 P.2d at 1133.

This allocation of the burden may seem inconsistent
with this court's holding, in State v. Haaen, 802 P.2d 745, 747
(Utah App. 1990), cert, granted April 23, 1991, Utah Supreme
Court No. 910017, that the burden is on the State to show that
defendant is not an Indian.

It is not inconsistent, however.

In light of Utah's statutory scheme for proof of
criminal jurisdiction, Haaen places the burden of jurisdictional
proof at trial on the State. Id. at 747; Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1201, 76-1-501(3) (1990).

However, this case involves a

jurisdictional challenge that has not been raised until long
after trial.

Accordingly, Viiil should control on remand, and

the burden should be on defendant, by proving that he is an
Indian, to show that the state court lacked jurisdiction.
Placing the burden of proof upon defendant under these
10

Defendant was tried and convicted in the Eighth Judicial
District Court. Utah's district courts have "original jurisdiction
in all matters except as limited by this constitution or by statute
. . . ." Utah Const. Art. VIII, S 5. "The district court has
original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not
excepted in the Constitution and not prohibited by law." Utah Code
Ann. S 78-3-4(1) (1990).
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circumstances would also be sound policy.

As noted earlier, this

jurisdictional challenge may encourage other defendants to raise
the Indian jurisdiction question, even if it was never raised at
trial.

Placing the burden on defendants to prove the absence of

jurisdiction will expedite the handling of such future belated
claims.

It will also help discourage those claims that are

frivolous.

Finally, it will be the defendants pressing such

claims, and not the State, who will have ready access to the
information needed to show that they are Indians, and that
jurisdiction should be examined.
In summary, if defendant's jurisdictional challenge is
to be entertained at this late date, the trial court is the
proper place in which to do so-

If this challenge is thus

remanded to the trial court, the burden should be on defendant to
prove that he is an Indian.
CONCLUSION
Based either on Point One or Point Two of this brief,
defendant's conviction should be affirmed.

However, if this

court cannot affirm on either of those bases, neither should it
reverse the conviction, for no evidence relevant to defendant's
claimed Indian status exists in the record now on appeal.

In

that event, as set forth in Point Three, this case should be
remanded to the trial court, where defendant should bear the
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burden of proving that jurisdiction was lacking.
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